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REVIEW OF DANIEL P. COLEMAN,
PRESENCE AND PROCESS: A PATH
TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE FAITH
AND INCLUSIVE COMMUNITY
(NEWBERG, OR: BARCLAY PRESS,
2017)
Jeffrey Dudiak

D

aniel P. Coleman is an evangelical Friend who in this book
pushes hard for an agenda that many liberal Friends will heartily
embrace, though I suspect to the discomfort of the bulk of his fellow
evangelicals. Based on his own experience at the nexus of Christianity,
Quakerism, and Buddhist inspired meditative practices, his thesis,
in short, is that the heart of true religion is a mystical, pre-rational
(and thus pre-discursive) connection with Reality (perhaps a synonym
for “God”), which is the essence of all religions once the superficial,
thought-based particularities of doctrine are stripped away. His hope
for the revival of religion in the twenty-first century lies in the recovery
and popularization of the meditative/contemplative practices that
have been developed by the esoteric few (mostly monastics) of all
religions throughout their histories, and that are the pathway into this
transformative experience of Reality.
As someone who is both philosophically dubious of the book’s
central thesis, and a non-expert in the “mindfulness” movement (a
Westernized form of Buddhism) and related, Christianized versions
of such meditative practices (principally, perhaps, the “contemplative
prayer” movement), I must say that I thoroughly enjoyed Daniel’s
book, from which I learned much, and which challenged me to
consider my beliefs about and understandings of such matters anew.
Daniel writes well, drawing together a broad range of material
coherently and with clarity. He has done his homework, and produced
a concise and helpful introduction to the associated movements and
practices for which he advocates.
In the first chapter, Coleman defines his terms: Buddhist
“meditation” is basically synonymous with Christian “contemplation,”
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practices that facilitate participation in the “mystical,” which he
defines as the “immediate experience” of “God/the Absolute/
Ultimate Reality” at a deeper, unifying, “esoteric” level—associated
with “apophatic” prayer—than that afforded by the “exoteric” side
of religions that deal in doctrinal conceptualizations that divide—
associated with “kataphatic” prayer.
In the second chapter Coleman details some of the principal
characteristics of apophatic mysticism—renunciation (of all that
which impedes our access to the Real), recollection (of one’s attention
into the present moment), kenosis (self-emptying to make room
for the true Self or Christ), union (“deep relational unity with the
Ultimate Reality”), transformation (transformative self-awakening by
distinguishing the self from its thoughts, or “decentering”), morality
(the purging of impermanent thoughts and feelings that opens upon
healing and transforming love), and serenity (a deep and abiding
sense of calm)—illustrating each with examples from both Buddhist
meditative and Christian contemplative traditions. He then outlines
in general the shared practices of apophatic mystical traditions, “all
essentially methods of decentering and disengaging from the thoughtstream in order to become grounded in the Reality of the present
moment”—whereby (active) meditative attention to the particular
results in a broad (passive) awareness “through the use of an anchor
object of attention to facilitate decentering.”
Chapters three and four cover respectively the history and practice
of Buddhist meditation, specifically, the ways in which various strains
of Buddhism have been imported and accommodated into a Western
context, and of Christian contemplation beginning in the third
century of the common era through the late middle ages. While brief,
these chapters provide a helpful, beginning, historical framework for
the larger project. The same goes for the fifth chapter that introduces
as largely complementary the four main versions of contemporary
Christian contemplative practice that, across the interpenetration
with Buddhist thought and practice, have emerged and grown since
the 1970s in North America: centering prayer; Christian meditation;
Christian Zen; and Christian mindfulness.
The next two chapters seek to illustrate resonances between, first,
contemplative practices and Quakerism (from both the perspective of
a Buddhist encountering Quaker worship, and across quotations from
Quaker tradition), and then the resonances he perceives between
contemplation and process thought, both the process philosophies
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of Whitehead and Hartshorne and the process theologies of Cobb
and Griffin (particularly across its—in Coleman’s view contemplationcompatible—doctrines of panentheism, and its analysis of the divinely
influenced but still free “occasion”). A brief conclusion draws together
the various analyses of the book examining their implications for,
and possible contribution to, a re-visioning of religious life in North
America in the twenty-first Century.
Again, kudos to Daniel Coleman for a well-written, informative,
and challenging book. And yet, I am left with a number of questions,
indeed, even concerns, which I will attempt to articulate here across
an examination of three of the dichotomies around which (on
my reading) Coleman builds his analyses: the apophatic and the
kataphatic; the metaphysical and the prophetic; the universal and the
particular. In each case, the meditative/contemplative practices for
which Coleman advocates prioritizes the first of these terms, if not to
the exclusion of, then at least as the governing context for, the latter
terms, a move that Daniel advocates in order to deepen religious life,
but that I suspect may in fact impoverish it. As I am writing this review
for a Quaker journal, I will focus upon Quaker faith and practice as
the principal focus for my comments.
Indeed, Coleman opens his chapter on Quakerism and meditation
by quoting the Zen Buddhist scholar Teruyasu Tamura, who in
encountering Quaker worship appreciated the silence, but who
clearly experienced vocal ministry as an “interruption” of the more
important work of worship: the apophatic negation of all kataphatic
posits that cleared the way to the genuine experience of Reality
behind and deeper than anything we can think or say. Indeed, many
contemporary liberal Friends would sympathize with this sentiment.
And if Tamura later conceded to the Quaker style of worship a
role in the communal creation of philanthropic “Bodhisattvas,” he
nevertheless recommended that Friends should—given the limitation
imposed upon deep meditative work by the presence of kataphatic
ministry—augment such public worship by performing the essential,
foundational meditative work at home. For my part, I am not at all sure
that Quaker worship is “meditation,” or that the goal of meditation
is the goal of Quaker worship. Yes, certainly, there is an apophatic
“moment” in Quaker worship (and so it is easy to find quotations
that support this aspect), namely, the silence in which we clear our
hearts, quiet our minds, and bracket our desires and selves to create
the receptive space into which God may speak. But the silence is not
interrupted by, it is in the service of, the ministry that is spoken out of
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it—the complementary “moment” of Quaker worship. That we return
again to silence signifies not the negation of the particularity of the
ministry, but the commitment to listening ever again to the leadings
of the Spirit in our midst. If many Evangelical and Orthodox Friends
emphasize the kataphatic side of religious life to the virtual exclusion
of the apophatic side (and for whom, therefore, Coleman’s call for an
awareness of the latter is a healthy prescription), the antidote is not
to emphasize the apophatic to the marginalization of the kataphatic
(a syndrome from which many Liberal Friends already suffer). Rather,
the apophatic and the kataphatic are the systole and diastole of the
beating heart of Quaker worship, which is why, on my view at least,
neither Quaker worship, nor prayer—while both include an apophatic
moment—are fundamentally meditative or contemplative practices.
There is, relatedly, an assumption, at the core of the argument for
contemplative practices, that their purging and kenotic aspects serve
to cleanse the soul/self of its destructive and violent inclinations and
that the result will be a loving soul no longer doing harm, so able
now to contribute to the healing of the world. That is, the shared
(perhaps “Indo-European”) assumption of the various practices
outlined in Coleman’s book is that contact with “the Real,” that is,
the metaphysical emphasis, precedes and has as its side-effect positive
ethical implications. (And this is why, I think, Coleman, sharing
mysticism’s allergy to “thought” and to “theology,” nevertheless
attempts to ground his appeal in a metaphysical system: process
thought.) In contrast, prophetic (perhaps “semitic”) religious
traditions prioritize the ethical over the metaphysical, and see the
constitution of reality itself as the product of an “ethical” response
to God’s call. This fundamental spiritual distinction is obscured if all
religions are seen as having the same basic telos. It is my judgement,
moreover, that Quakers, particularly early Quakers, are far better
understood as adherents of the latter rather than the former religious
trajectory, such that a mystical/contemplative interpretation of
Quakerism perhaps does more to distort than to illuminate it.
Finally, in its rejection of “thoughts” (i.e., reason) as the principal
point of recourse, meditation seems at antipodes to modernity, but it
nevertheless adopts from modern thought the aspiration to transcend
merely parochial particulars toward a truly universal “object”—albeit
in this case a shared experience (beyond words) of the Real. But
just as modernity (until remarkably recently!) kept its dream alive
by ignoring the fact that there were any number of competing and
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incompatible versions of “universal Reason,” I am not convinced that
the experience of “God” by some and “Ultimate Reality” by others
and “the Absolute” by others still (not to mention the variations
of each of these and others) is really the same experience, or the
experience of the same under disposable because idiosyncratic names,
despite some structural similarities between such experiences. (While
there are structural similarities between any number of marriages,
to whom one is married in particular profoundly affects both one’s
experience of marriage, and even of how one subsequently conceives
of marriage.) It is also not clear (as it was not clear for modernism)
that this doctrine really achieves what it is intended to achieve in
any case; the attempt to transcend the model wherein one religion
is taken to have the truth to the exclusion of another is achieved
by substituting the opposition of those who, of any religion, have
experienced the truth of religion over against those who are stuck in
the mere particularities of any given religion—that is, by substituting
a new version of, rather than undermining, the religious truth-falsity
duality. It may well be (although this will have to be the discussion
of another day) that “universality” is not to be achieved through the
marginalization of particularities, but by deepening them, by seeing
them as the ways in which “we” (this particular community) respond
to that to which we in particular are called, in the service of all. And
it may well be that the “universal” significance of our Quakerism
(and our Quakerly service) is not to be realized by demonstrating
its resonance with some authentic religion-in-general, but by rooting
ourselves more profoundly in the faith and practices of this peculiar
people.
To conclude, Coleman is correct to note that the popularization
of contemplative practices is having a significant effect upon the
North American religious landscape as we enter the twenty-first
Century, something clearly evinced already among Liberal Quakers.
As thinking Friends, it is incumbent upon us to be informed about
this phenomenon, and to carefully consider its implications. Gratitude
to Daniel Coleman for his important contribution to a conversation
we need to have. May it continue.

